



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19 October 1964

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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19 October 1964

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

19 October 1964

### DAILY BRIEF

USSR: The new Soviet leaders are attempting to give the impression of business as usual, and there have been no indications of popular unrest or disorder.

The US Embassy reports that Moscow citizens tended to respond initially to Khrushchev's ouster in a disinterested, almost apathetic manner. Some people reacted with a shock of disbelief, while others expressed skepticism about the official explanation. A few critical comments and expressions of anxiety were also heard.

Many people spoke favorably of Khrushchev and lamented his removal. Criticism was directed mainly at the way in which the ouster was effected.

Rumors of further removals persist, but there have been no official announcements on personnel actions since the original Brezhnev-Kosygin changes were made.

Rumors that the editors of Pravda and Izvestia and the head of the state radio-television committee have been removed are probably true, however. It is to be expected that Khrushchev's personal advisory staff and other members of his office retinue, including the top officials of his security detail, have also been sacked. Higher level changes may be announced as soon as the new leaders have had time to solidify their position.


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The concern of the new Soviet leaders to dissuade the West from any attempts to exploit the changeover in Moscow was reflected in the 17 October Soviet-Cuban communiqué on President Dorticos' visit. The communiqué noted that Cuba is still being threatened by "aggressive actions" by US "imperialist circles" and reaffirmed the Soviet Union's "full solidarity and resolute support" for the Castro regime.

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19 Oct 64

DAILY BRIEF

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\*Communist China: World reaction to Communist China's nuclear test continues to accumulate.

The East German Communist Party's official organ, Neues Deutschland, joined the Yugoslav government and press in accusing China of "brusquely disregarding worldwide demands for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons." The Yugoslav Foreign Office added that the Chinese explosion would encourage militant anti-colonialists in the non-aligned camp. It also said that China could not forever be excluded from disarmament negotiations. The Albanian Communist Party and press on 17 and 18 October aggressively elaborated on earlier congratulatory comments by making clear that China had developed nuclear weapons in order to "smash the monopoly of the nuclear powers, destroy their weapons, and defend socialism." China's success, they claimed, was the result of the "just Marxist-Leninist line and leadership of the Chinese Communist Party."

President Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese press and radio, as well as the North Korean government and party, joined Albanian media in an aggressive tone. They said this "fruitful result of the line of self-reliance...under the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party" had struck the "imperialists and their lackeys (with) alarm" and had held in check "the aggressive and war schemes of the US imperialists." Pyongyang radio called it an "inspiration to all fighting revolutionary peoples." The clandestine Pathet Lao radio said China's ability "to defend world peace against the US imperialists" had been strengthened.

High officials of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand commented that no foreseeable development of nuclear capacity by the Chinese could significantly affect the balance of military power in view of the defense systems available to the Western Alliance. In France, scientists called the explosion "rather rudimentary." Germany's former chancellor Adenauer and Australia's Minister of External Affairs, however, both

indicated that Peiping would attempt to increase its influence in Asia. The London Times, as well as official circles in Canada and Scandinavia, felt Communist China might be more subject to world opinion if it were a member of the United Nations.

Turkey and Greece were preoccupied with Khrushchev's ouster. Pro-government papers in Greece downplayed the significance of China's experiment. One Greek opposition paper felt China's feat would impress the Afro-Asian nations. Egypt has not commented as yet on the Chinese nuclear test.

The Government of India, while minimizing the significance of the Chinese blast, was seriously concerned over its effect on New Delhi's relations with Moscow and Peiping. It was attempting to ensure that friendly relations with the USSR would continue. The Indian Communist Party (not contradicted by its pro-Chinese wing) condemned Peiping, charging it with pursuing "expansionist aims." The Pakistani radio, however, stressed China's efforts to ban and destroy nuclear weapons and noted that China could not remain idle in the face of the American nuclear threat.

Indonesian Coordinator Minister for Public Relations, Abdulgani, said that the Chinese blast was an open announcement that Asians have capabilities equal to those of Western nations and that the "West can no longer encircle the peoples of Asia and Africa." The Chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party said China's and Asia's prestige had been greatly raised. The Cambodian Government claimed that China's "victory is also the victory of all Asian, African, and Latin American peoples, victims of the contempt and chauvinism of the imperialists and colonialists." The Malaysian press feared Indonesia would now step up its aggressive actions. Taipei called the nuclear test a "propaganda stunt," and South Korea minimized its importance. Some Thai newspapers followed suit.

[REDACTED]

Following the Japanese government's official protest, non-Communist Japanese political parties and labor organizations also sent cables of protest to Peiping.

The Premiers of Uganda and Somalia condemned China's nuclear test as contrary to the policies of the African states and to the trend of the recent non-aligned conference in Cairo. The Ghanaian Times on 17 October called the explosion a "major achievement" in China's effort to oppose US "nuclear blackmail."

Reaction in Latin America is still sparse, and no official pronouncement has been made. An influential Brazilian daily editorialized that Peiping's possession of the atom bomb means it should be admitted to the United Nations. A government party congressman in Peru also said Peiping's nuclear detonation would strengthen its claim to UN membership. A prominent Costa Rican radio station reported the nuclear blast as meaning that China's "hard line" would win out in the Sino-Soviet controversy. Havana's reporting continues to be limited to replaying Radio Peiping's announcements. [REDACTED]



\*South Vietnam: There are signs of growing Buddhist restiveness over Premier Khanh's maneuvers to influence the new government.

Buddhist leader Tri Quang has told the US Embassy that Khanh's recent behavior has demonstrated the premier's inability to lead the country. Quang said that he would not object to Khanh's holding a prominent but purely military role. Quang implied, however, that if Khanh emerged as the key government leader, he would urge Buddhists not to cooperate.

There may be growing concern in the Buddhist hierarchy that the Viet Cong would exploit any new Buddhist demonstrations. In the past few days, public statements by both moderate and militant Buddhist officials have denounced the Viet Cong for forcing Buddhists in central Vietnam to stage "fake" demonstrations, and have used their strongest terms to date in warning that Buddhism is opposed to Communism.

[The promulgation of a new constitution by the High National Council has been postponed while the council tries to reconcile the views of Khanh and young military officers, on the one hand, and General Minh and civilian leaders, on the other. Khanh told the council on 15 October that he could not accept its proposed draft, which gives strong powers to the chief of state--probably Minh. Khanh warned that the council must provide an independent role for the military or risk a new military coup.]

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Britain: (The new Labor government's need to consolidate its domestic position during its first months of office will almost certainly result in deferment of any major foreign policy decisions for some time.)

(Prime Minister Wilson's first priority is the establishment and maintenance of cohesion within his own thinly stretched and traditionally contentious party. Also, Britain faces a serious balance-of-payments problem, and the immediate economic situation will require the new government's full attention, according to the US Embassy in London.)

(Ambassador Bruce notes that Wilson is keenly aware of the paramount necessity over the longer run of reaching accord with the US on the general terms of defense and foreign policy. Bruce believes Wilson would assent to participate in the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) only if he judges he can gain national advantages, and then only after extensive bargaining with the US on the whole issue of NATO and defense.)

(Bruce believes the greatest danger to US-British accord on the MLF and subsequent questions confronting the alliance is Wilson's belief that he can bargain with the Soviets more successfully than can other Western leaders. He may hope to obtain a spectacular Soviet offer on disarmament in return for persuading the US to abandon the MLF. A lesser danger could be his high expectations in regard to the quid pro quo he might get from the US in return for renouncing Britain's independent deterrent.)

(Bruce considers that Wilson's high opinion of his own negotiating ability is largely justified, and that he will be fully in charge of his government, leaving his foreign and defense ministers very much in his shadow.)

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Iraq-Egypt: The decision to establish a unified Egyptian-Iraqi political command as a step toward full union of the two countries amounts to the minimum Egyptian response to Iraqi pleas for immediate union.

Members of the "joint presidential council" set up last summer have been meeting in Cairo for several days, with Iraqi President Arif in attendance, to discuss the unity question. A handful of pro-Nasir Iraqi officers occupying key staff and cabinet posts have been pushing for rapid constitutional union.

Nasir, however, distrusts Arif and almost certainly recognizes that full union would involve him in complex and virtually insoluble Iraqi internal problems. He probably also believes that announcement of full union would spark a violent reaction from anti-Egyptian Iraqis.

The 16 October announcement of the new political command is thus a sop to the Iraqi unionists. The unified command is to "take all practicable steps" to achieve constitutional union within two years and will have undefined supervisory responsibility in the fields of foreign policy, armed forces and defense, national security, economic planning, culture, national guidance, and education. Egypt already handles diplomatic affairs for Iraq in countries where Iraq has no diplomatic representation.

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Panama: Expressions of dissatisfaction over relations with the United States are increasing and could cause serious problems for the new Robles government.

Even progovernment deputies recently joined in strong attacks against the US as the National Assembly passed a resolution criticizing the "unjust aggression" of US forces last January. Panamanian news media are complaining over the apparent lack of progress in discussions with the US over the Canal issue. The radio station identified with defeated presidential candidate Arnulfo Arias has several times charged the Robles government with duping the Panamanian public about the talks.

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

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The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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